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I. INTRODUCTION
It has been ten years since Congress enacted the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA)' in an attempt to provide a uniform federal re-
sponse to the growing national crisis of uncontrolled hazardous
waste sites. 2 From its inception, CERCLA's goals were twofold:
to target hazardous waste sites for cleanup and compel those par-
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980 §§ 101-175, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (here-
inafter CERCLA).
2. See infra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
(537)
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ties responsible for the sites to bear the burden of the cleanup
costs. 3 Since that time, disclosures of ill-conceived planning on
the part of corporations, private individuals, and of states in fi-
nancing, constructing, and storing hazardous wastes have contin-
ued to raise major concerns for the American public. 4 The
burden of funding these cleanups has placed an ever increasing
strain on federal, state, and corporate fiscal budgets. 5 The fed-
eral government has estimated that in the next five years private
and public sectors will be spending between $13 billion and $20
billion annually on hazardous waste cleanup and disposal.6
In order to prevent the bulk of these costs from falling on the
innocent taxpayer, CERCLA empowers the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) 7 to create a system for identifying those
3. See Comment, The Liability of Financial Institutions for Hazardous Waste
Cleanup Costs Under CERCLA, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 139, 142 (1988) [hereinafter
Institutions]; see also Note, Superfund Settlements: The Failed Promise of the 1986
Amendments, 74 VA. L. REv. 123 (1988) [hereinafter Superfund Settlements].
4. See Waste Control Issues Follows Air, Water To Become Top U.S. Environmental
Concern, 16 Env't Rep. (BNA) 6-7 (May 3, 1985) (discussing emergence of waste
disposal concerns on national regulatory agenda).
5. Superfund Settlements, 74 VA. L. REV. 123, 124 (1980) (quoting from office
of Technology Assessment, Superfund Strategy 14 (1985)). This Comment esti-
mates the extent of unqontrollable hazardous waste sites around the country to
be between 1,500 and 10,000, a figure not anticipated by the authors of CER-
CLA when they enacted these statutory provisions in 1980. Id. The overall costs
of cleaning up these sites is estimated at $10 billion to $100 billion. Id. See also
53 Fed. Reg. 23,988 (1988).
6. See Comment, The Liability of Financial Institutions for Hazardous Waste
Cleanup Costs Under CERCLA 1988 Wis. L. REV. 139, 140 (1988) (quoting New
York Times, August 31, 1983 at 1, col. 1). See also Insurance Coverage for Superfund
Liability Defense and Cleanup Costs: The Need for a Nonlitigation Approach, 19 Env't L
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10203 (1989). This more recent article suggests that the
new cleanup standards incorporated into CERCLA by the adaptation of the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) amendments have
driven up the costs of remedial actions at hazardous waste sites and delayed
their final cleanup process. Id. The article suggests that Congress failed to take
into consideration the future growth in the number and type of hazardous waste
sites used by hundreds and possibly thousands of potentially responsible parties
(PRPs) when formulating CERCLA and the subsequent SARA amendments. Id.
As a result, this article suggests that the funds required for the cleanup of these
hazardous waste sites may triple and possibly quadruple in cost, resulting in pri-
vate and public expenditures in the range of $30 million to $50 million dollars
per site, with half as much used to cover the costs of litigation. Id. The article
suggests that if Congress had incorporated more nonlitigative means for resolv-
ing PRP disputes in CERCLA, the costs of cleaning up waste sites could have
been reduced by half. Id.
7. Under section 106(a) of CERCLA, the EPA is authorized by the Presi-
dent of the United States to make determinations on the potential dangers to the
public health or welfare of the environment based on an actual or threatened
release of a hazardous substance from a waste site facility. Id. In order to en-
force the CERCLA provisions, the EPA may invoke the aid of the Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States to bring suit against those parties who threaten the
2
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hazardous waste sites which pose an imminent threat to the envi-
ronment, while compelling those who are liable for the conditions
existing at a particular site to pay for their share of the cleanup
costs.8 Under section 107(a) of CERCLA, past and present haz-
ardous waste site owners, operators, generators, and transporters
may be subject to joint and several strict liability for the cleanup
of a particular site.9 With the number of uncontrolled hazardous
waste sites estimated in the range of 1,500 to 10,000 nationally,' °&
courts have found themselves in the sensitive role of continually
redefining "owner and operator" under CERCIA in order to as-
sure that all parties who have contributed to the hazardous waste
site pay for its reclamation."I
This Comment focuses on the expanding definition of
health of the public and environment with the release of hazardous substances.
Id. Under section 106(b) of CERCLA, the EPA may fine up to $5,000 each day
any person who willfully violates or refuses to abate the threat of a release of
hazardous waste from a facility under the Act. Id.
8. See supra note 3.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). The persons liable under CERCLA section 107(a)
are:
1. the owners and operator of a vessel or a facility,
2. any person who at the time of the disposal of any hazardous sub-
stances owned or operated a facility at which hazardous substances
were disposed of,
3. any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
the disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport
for disposal or treatment of hazardous substances owned or possessed
by such a person, by another party or entity, at any facility.., owned or
operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous sub-
stances, and
4. any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities ... or sites selected by such
person, from which there is a release, or threatened release which
causes the incurrence of response costs of hazardous substances shall
be liable for:
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State . . . not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
person consistent with the national contingency plan; and
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural re-
sources, including the reasonable costs for assessing such injury, de-
struction, or loss resulting from such a release.
Id.
10. See supra note 5.
11. See generally Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989)
(holding that states were subject to private actions brought under section 107(a)
of CERCLA); Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d
1568 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding developers of subdivision containing toxic waste
were liable as transporters of toxic waste, even though waste had been stored on
the property by a prior sublessee); New York v. Shore Realty Co., 759 F.2d 1032
(2d Cir. 1985) (holding that stockholders and corporate officers could be subject
3
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"owner and operator" of a hazardous waste site under section
107(a) of CERCLA.' 2 After explaining the relevant statutory pro-
visions, this Comment analyzes recent judicial decisions which
demonstrate how the courts, in their efforts to apply section
107(a) in accordance with legislative intent, have continued to ex-
tend CERCLA's definition of "owner and operator" to parties
previously considered exempt from the Act's jurisdiction. 3
While acknowledging CERCLA's success in determining who is
liable under the Act, this Comment will show how CERCLA has
failed to provide for an equitable distribution of the cleanup costs
among the responsible parties. This Comment will then present a
strategy for improving the implementation of CERCLA's policy of
apportioning liability, namely, an amendment to the Act requir-
ing mandatory insurance coverage for any individual or entity en-
gaged in the business of storing or transporting hazardous waste
materials.' 4 Lastly, this Comment suggests how certain changes
in the insurance industry itself could effectuate this mandatory
requirement.
II. THE STATUTORY STRUCTURE OF CERCLA
A. The Environmental Protection Agency and Its Enforcement
Powers Under CERCLA
CERCLA enables the EPA' 5 to exercise Presidential author-
ity in identifying active and abandoned hazardous waste sites
across the nation.' 6 The EPA is required to respond to a release
or potential release of hazardous substances by removing them
from a site pursuant to a National Contingency Plan (NCP).' 7
Section 131 of CERCLA provides for the establishment of a Haz-
to liability under CERCLA section 107(a) for participation and management of
waste facility site).
12. See supra note 9.
13. See infra notes 29-61 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 29-61 and accompanying text.
15. CERCLA § 103(d)(1) provides: "The Administrator of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations
specifying, with respect to (A) the location, title, or condition of a facility; and
(B) the identity, characteristics, quantity, origin, or condition (including con-
tainerization and previous treatment) of any hazardous substances contained or
deposited in the facility ...." Id.
16. The President's authority has been delegated to the EPA. See Exec. Or-
der No. 12,286, 46 Fed. Reg. 9901 (1981).
17. Found in section 105 of CERCILA, the NCP provides federal standards
for responding to releases of hazardous substances. Id. The NCP sets forth up-
dated guidelines for investigating hazardous waste sites and procedures for de-
termining the extent of response activities. Id.
4
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ardous Substances Response Trust Fund (Superfund) I to finance
the cleanup process. The EPA also enlists the aid of the Justice
Department in bringing actions against potentially responsible
parties to reimburse Superfund for its cleanup costs.' 9
B. Owner and Operator Defined Under CERCLA
A major concern of Congress when it enacted CERCLA and
its subsequent amendments compiled under the Supeffund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) 20 was to
assure that all parties responsible for the creation of a hazardous
waste site contribute their proportionate share toward the
cleanup costs. Section 101 (20)(A) 21 classifies liable parties under
CERCLA as "persons" owning or operating a hazardous waste
facility. Under section 101 (2 1) of CERCLA, a "person" is defined
as "an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, con-
sortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Govern-
ment, municipality, commission, political subdivisions of a State,
or any interstate body." 22
While sections 101 (20) (A) and 101 (21) stipulate who may be
18. The Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund (better known as
Superfund) was established under section 131 of CERCILA to fund actions taken
by the EPA in the cleanup of hazardous waste facilities. Revenue for Superfund
is obtained from taxes on crude oil, imported petroleum products, hazardous
chemicals and general appropriations. As a result of the passage of SARA in
1986, Congress has made available $8 billion to Superfund over the next five
years. See Superfund Revenue Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613
(1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (Supp. V 1987).
19. Under subsection 106(a) of CERCIA, the EPA may delegate to the At-
torney General of the United States the authority to prosecute those persons
who violate any of the statutory provisions contained in CERCIA. Id.
20. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1615 (1986) (codified and scattered in
U.S.C. sections 29, 33, & 42).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A). CERCLA section 101(20)(A) provides that:
"owner and operator" means (i) in the case of a vessel, any person own-
ing, operating, or chartering by demise, such vessel, (ii) in the case of
an onshore facility or offshore facility, any person owning or operating
such a facility, and (iii) in the case of any ... abandoned facility... any
person who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such
a facility immediately [prior to such abandonment] .... Such terms do
not include a person, who, without participating in the management of
a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his
security interest in the vessel or facility.
Id.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21). CERCLA section 101(21) provides that:
"person" means an individual, firm, corporation, association, partner-
ship, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Gov-
ernment, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a
State, or any interstate body.
5
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a responsible "person" under the Act, section 107(a) defines four
classes of individuals who would be liable as "owners and opera-
tors" of waste facility sites under CERCLA.23 These individuals
include current owners and operators of waste site facilities, past
owners and operators of waste site facilities, generators of hazard-
ous waste, and those who accept waste for purposes of transport-
ing it to disposal facilities. 24
C. Standard of Liability Under CERCLA
Defining the standard of liability under CERCLA has been a
major preoccupation of courts in their interpretation of the Act.25
CERCLA's liability section contains no language requiring the
EPA to demonstrate that a defendant acted negligently in the dis-
posal of its waste. 26 It also has been suggested that CERCLA pro-
vides for the imposition of joint and several liability among the
responsible parties.27 Thus, one of several defendants could be
held strictly liable under the Act to compensate the government
for the entire cost of the cleanup of a particular waste site.28 The
CERCLA defendant must prove the availability of one of the
three categories of affirmative defenses found in section 107(b) of
the Act.2 9 If he cannot, he will be forced to take responsibility for
23. See supra note 9 for full text of section 107(a).
24. Id.
25. See generally Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989);
Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir.
1988); New York v. Shore Realty Co., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); Rockwell
International Corp. v. UI International Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384 (N.D. Ill.
1988).
26. CERCLA originally contained language in section 101(32) holding per-
sons strictly liable for any violations under the Act. But in order to assure pas-
sage of the Act, Congress deleted from that section any mention of strict liability
provisions. See 126 CONG. REC. 30, 932 (1980).
27. CERCLA § 101 (32) defines liability as the standard of liability found in
section 331 of the Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982). Many courts have
interpreted section 331 of the Clean Water Act as imposing strict liability. See
generally Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989); Tanglewood
East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1988); New
York v. Shore Realty Co., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); Rockwell International
Corp. v. UI International Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Channel
Master Satellite Systems, Inc. v. JFD Electronics Co., 702 F. Supp. 1229
(E.D.N.C. 1988).
28. Language endorsing joint and several liability was deleted from CER-
CIA along with any references to strict liability. By leaving the liability standard
ambiguous, CERCLA sponsors intended that the courts be free to impose joint
and several liability when consistent with established common law principles.
See 126 CONG. REC. 30, 932 (1980).
29. See infra note 64 for the full text of CERCLA § 107(b).
6
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol1/iss2/5
1990] APPORTIONING LLABILrTY 543
the cleanup of a hazardous waste site.30 A CERCLA defendant
may, however, bring suit against any other responsible parties to
recover their pro-rated share of this liability.3'
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF "OWNER AND
OPERATORS" UNDER CERCLA
A. Shifting the Burdens of Hazardous Waste Cleanup to
Those Responsible Under CERCLA
Federal courts have consistently interpreted section 107(a) of
CERCLA in favor of the government. One may be deemed an
"owner" of a hazardous waste site without possessing legal title to
the land upon which the facility is built, if, as a lessee, one had the
ability to determine how the land was to be used.3 2 A corporate
shareholder or officer may be held personally liable for acts at-
tributed to the corporation if that officer or shareholder con-
trolled the corporation's decision-making process with respect to
the disposal of hazardous wastes.33 The federal courts are re-
30. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1). CERCLA section 113(f) provides:
(f) Contribution
(1) Contribution
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is
liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this tide, during or
following any civil action under section 9606 of this title or under sec-
tion 9607(a) of this title. Such claims shall be brought in accordance
with this section and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and shall be
governed by Federal law. In resolving contribution claims, the court
may allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable
factors as the court determines are appropriate. Nothing in this subsec-
tion shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action for contri-
bution in the absence of a civil action under section 9606 or section
9607 of this title.
Id.
31. See CERCLA § 107(a)(1)-(4) quoted supra note 9.
32. See U.S. v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988). In Monsanto, the
court held that landowners who leased land to a company on which hazardous
waste was subsequently stored, were liable under CERCIA for costs incurred by
the State and U.S. Government in removing the hazardous waste from the land,
even though they claimed that they were innocent absentee landlords. Id. at
168. The court also held that the defendant had failed to present evidence that
the release of hazardous substances from their land were caused "solely by a
third party other than... one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a
contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly with the defendant," as
required by CERCLA § 107(b)(3). Id. See also Rockwell International Corp. v.
UI International Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
33. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp. 759 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1985)
(court of appeals affirmed lower court's finding that owner of hazardous waste
site, along with corporate officers and shareholders who contributed to manage-
ment of hazardous waste facility, could be liable under CERCLA for cleanup of
hazardous waste site).
7
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quired to efficiently interpret the statutory provisions found in
CERCIA in such a way as to compel those deemed responsible
for hazardous waste facilities to disgorge the necessary funds for
their cleanup.3 4 Recent decisions by the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts have established a trend toward expanding
the definition of "owner and operator," in the absence of Con-
gressional provisions limiting the scope of liability under the Act,
for the purpose of generating funds for cleanup.3 5
States have recently been held liable under section 107(a) as
"owners and operators" of hazardous waste facilities. In the case
of Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Company,3 6 the Supreme Court of the
United States was asked to decide whether a state which contrib-
uted to the release of hazardous substances into the local environ-
ment could be held liable in a private action for its proportionate
share of the cleanup CoStS. 3 7 Before arriving at its decision, the
Court addressed two main issues in its application of CERCLA:
(1) whether the Act, as amended by SARA, permitted private ac-
tions against a state in a federal court; and (2) whether Congress
had the right to create such a cause of action when legislating
pursuant to the Commerce Clause.38
In its analysis of the first issue, the Court found that section
101(20)(D) 3 9 of CERCLA held liable any state or local govern-
34. See generally Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989);
Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir.
1988); New York v. Shore Realty Co., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); Rockwell
International Corp. v. UI International Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384 (N.D. Ill.
1988); Channel Master Satellite Systems, Inc. v. JFD Electronics Corp., 702 F.
Supp. 1229 (E.D.N.C. 1988).
35. See generally Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989);
Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir.
1988); New York v. Shore Realty Co., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); United
States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615 (D.N.H. 1988).
36. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
37. Id. at 2274. In 1980, shortly after acquiring easements to the property
along a creek, the state struck a large deposit of coal tar during excavation of the
creek bed. Id. The tar began to seep into the creek, and the EPA determined
that the tar was a hazardous substance and declared the site the nation's first
emergency Superfund site. Id. The EPA brought action against the respondent
Union Gas, claiming that it was liable for such costs because the company and its
predecessors had deposited the coal tar near the creek. Id. Union Gas then filed
a third-party complaint against Pennsylvania, asserting that the state was respon-
sible for at least a portion of the costs because it was deemed an "owner and
operator" of the site under CERCILA section 107(a). Id. For a discussion of the
holding in Union Gas, see infra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
38. Id. at 2275.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D). CERCLA section 101(20)(D) provides:
The term "owner or operator" does not include a unit of State or
local government which acquired ownership or control involuntarily
8
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ment which caused or contributed to the release or threatened
release of a hazardous substance. 40 Additionally, the Court found
that the language in section 120(a)(1), 4 1 waiving the federal gov-
ernment's right to immunity against private suits brought under
CERCLA, was virtually identical to that found in section
101 (20) (D),42 which provided for state and local government lia-
bility under the Act. The Court dismissed Pennsylvania's argu-
ment that CERCLA merely makes clear that states may be liable
to the United States,43 while exempting them from private actions
for violations brought under the Act. The Court found that Con-
gress "would have had no cause to stress that states would be
liable to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity under
section 101(20)(D), if it had meant that they would only be liable
to the United States. 44
In addressing the issue of whether Congress was empowered
by the Constitution to authorize such legislation pursuant to the
through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment, or other circum-
stances in which the government involuntarily acquires title by virtue of
its function as sovereign. The exclusion provided under this paragraph
shall not apply to any State or local government which has caused or
contributed to the release or threatened release of a hazardous sub-
stance from the facility, and such State or local government shall be
subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the
same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any nongovern-
mental entity, including liability under section 9607 of this title.
Id.
40. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2279.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1). Section 120(a)(1) of CERCILA provides: "Each
department, agency, and instrumentality of the United States (including the ex-
ecutive, legislative, and judicial branches of government) shall be subject to, and
comply with, this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent, both pro-
cedurally and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability
under section 9607 of this title ...." Id.
42. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2279. The Court stated that the language in
this section of the Act represented an "unequivocal expression" of the federal
government's waiver of its sovereign immunity. Id. The Court determined that
in choosing this mirroring language in section 101(20)(D), Congress must have
intended to override the states' immunity from suit, just as it waived the federal
government's immunity in section 120(a)(1). Id.
43. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2280. Pennsylvania insisted that CERCLA
merely makes clear that states may be liable to the United States, not that they may
be liable to private entities such as Union Gas. Id. The Court found that,
although the inclusion of states within CERCLA's definition of "persons" would
not be rendered meaningless if it were held that CERCLA did not subject the
states to suits brought against them by private citizens, it would deprive the last
portion of section 101(20)(D) of all its meaning. Id. The Court stated that, "[i]n
light of section 101 (20)(D)'s very precise language, it would be exceedingly odd
to interpret this provision as merely a signal that the United States, rather than
private citizens, could sue the state for damages under CERCLA." Id.
44. Id. at 2279.
9
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Commerce Clause,45 the Court determined that the language of
the Eleventh Amendment placed no limitations on the power of
Congress to override states' immunity when legislating pursuant
to the Commerce Clause.46 In order to achieve the objective of
apportioning liability to those parties responsible for hazardous
waste sites, the Court held that the Congressional power to regu-
late commerce included the authority to hold states financially ac-
countable, not only to the federal government but to private
citizens as well.47
While Union Gas Company 48 clarified state liability under CER-
CLA, lower federal courts have continued to revise the definition
of "owner and operator" under section 107(a)49 when applying it
to one of the most conspicuous potentially responsible parties,
the corporation. In Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas,
Inc. ,50 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that companies involved in the development of a subdivision
contaminated with hazardous waste could be liable under CER-
CLA for response costs as an "owner and operator" of a waste
facility, even though another company had been operating the fa-
cility at the time the waste had accumulated on the property. 51
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (grants Congress the power to monitor
interstate commerce).
46. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2282. The Court held that the states surren-
dered a portion of their sovereignty when they granted Congress the power to
regulate commerce. Id. (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 451 (1976)).
The Court found that Congress' authority to regulate commerce includes the
authority directly to abrogate states' immunity under the Eleventh Amendment,
from suits brought by private individuals under CERCLA. Id.
47. Id. at 2285. The Court reasoned that, because the government's re-
sources were finite, it could not pay for all the necessary cleanups under CER-
CLA. Id. Therefore, Congress enacted CERCLA section 101(20)(D) to
encourage private parties who voluntarily cleaned up hazardous waste sites to
recover a proportionate amount of the costs from the states, which comprise a
significant class of owners and operators of hazardous waste sites. Id.
The Court also stated that Article III of the U.S. Constitution, establishing
the jurisdiction of federal courts over controversies between a state and a citizen
of another state, and a state and foreign citizens or subjects, extended to any
suits for damages brought by private citizens against states. Id. By approving
the Commerce Clause, the Court reasoned that the states consented to suits
against them based on a congressionally created cause of action. Id.
48. Id.
49. See CERCLA § 107(a)(l)-(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4).
50. Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568
(5th Cir. 1988).
51. Id. at 1572. The subdivision was on the site upon which a prior owner
had established a wood treatment facility. Id. at 1571. During its operation,
substantial amounts of highly toxic waste were on the property. Id. The appel-
lants argued that CERCILA section 107(a)(1) applied only to the "owners and
operators" who actually generated and discharged the hazardous waste on the
10
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The court held that a subdivision was a "facility" under the Act
for the purpose of asserting a private cause of action to recover
costs. 52 The court also held that lending institutions, developers,
construction companies, and realtors may be designated "owners
and operators" under section 107(a)(1) and liable for the cleanup
costs of the subdivision. 53
The court in Tanglewood dismissed assertions made by the ap-
pellants that CERCLA liability covered only those "owners and
operators" who discharged or caused the hazardous substances to
accumulate on the property.54 Relying on the decision of the Sec-
ond Circuit in New York v. Shore Realty Corp.,55 the court deter-
mined that, because section 107(a)(2) expressly applied to past
owners and operators who contaminated their property, "it was
self-evident that the language contained in section 107(a)(1) im-
posed strict liability on the current owners of any facility that re-
leased or threatened to release a toxic substance," even though
they had not participated in the storage or transportation of haz-
ardous substances to the site.56
Corporate shareholders and officers may also find themselves
individually liable for the act of a corporation in the management
of a waste facility site. In United States v. Mottolo,57 the govern-
ment, on behalf of the EPA, brought a consolidated civil action
against several corporations and a specific class of shareholders
for costs incurred in connection with the cleanup of a hazardous
property. Id. at 1572. The court held that the wording of section 107(a) did not
exclude present owners and operators of properties previously contaminated.
Id. Because the appellants engaged in the activities of filling and grading the
land, causing the hazardous waste in the land to be released into the local envi-
ronment, they could be subject to liability under CERCLA. Id. at 1574.
52. CERCLA section 101(9) defines "facility" as:
... (A) any building, structure, installation, equipment pipe or pipeline
(including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works),
well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container,
motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft; or (B) any site or area where a
hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or
otherwise come to be located; but does not include any product in use or any
vessel.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(a) (emphasis added).
53. Tanglewood, 849 F.2d at 1572.
54. Id.
55. New York v. Shore Realty Co., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985). The Shore
court held that the developer-owners were liable for the cleanup costs of their
facility even though no construction or development had been undertaken. Id.
at 1043.
56. Tanglewood, 849 F.2d at 1572.
57. United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615 (D.N.H. 1988).
1990] 547
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waste site. 58 The court first addressed the issue of whether liabil-
ity under CERCLA was retroactive and included all costs that
were incurred by the government and private entities in the
cleanup of hazardous waste sites prior to the authorization of the
Act. The court held that, because the Act failed to limit recovery
of response costs to prospective violations, Congress intended
CERCLA provisions to be applied retroactively. 59 The court rea-
soned that, in order to avoid frustrating CERCLA's beneficial
purposes, courts are obligated to construe CERCLA provisions
liberally.6° After determining that the site was a "facility" under
CERCLA,6 1 the district court held that the corporate form could
not be used to shield the defendant site owner from cleanup costs
under CERCLA. The court stated that, while the corporate entity
is generally recognized for most purposes, it may not be em-
ployed to avoid overriding federal legislative policies.6 2
The court concluded its analysis by stating that one of CER-
CLA's express goals was to ensure that "those responsible for
problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the
costs and responsibility for remedying the harmful contition." 63
58. Id. at 618. The EPA and the State of New Hampshire sought reim-
bursement of costs incurred in the cleaning up of a hazardous waste dump man-
aged by a Massachusetts corporation, its president, treasurer, and owner of the
corporation. Id. The court based its jurisdiction on CERCLA section 113(b),
which provides in part that "the United States district courts shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over all controversies arising under this chapter, without regard to
the citizenship of the parties or the amount in controversy.. ." 42 U.S.C. 9613.
59. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. at 621. The court stated that, because CERCLA
failed to explicitly limit the recovery of response costs to prospective violations,
courts have construed CERCLA's provisions to be applied retroactively. Id. (cit-
ing O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706, 729 (D.R.I. 1988)). The court also found
that the retroactive application of CERCLA would not offend due process. Id.
60. Id. at 622. The court held that the express goals of CERCLA were to
provide the federal government with the means necessary for a prompt response
to the problems resulting from hazardous waste disposal and to ensure that
those parties responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poi-
sons bear the costs of remedying the harmful conditions they created. Id. The
court therefore held that it would not interpret CERCLA section 107(a) in any
way that would frustrate the Act's goals, in the absence of a specific congres-
sional intention otherwise. Id.
61. Id. at 623.
62. Id. at 624. The court stated that the fiction that a corporation is an
entity independent of its stockholders is not favored in New Hampshire and will
be disregarded when justice so demands it. Id. The court reasoned that, in the
absence of explicit statutory language addressing the effect of incorporation,
CERCIA's strict liability scheme, and the broad and encompassing categories of
potentially responsible parties, leads to the conclusion that CERCLA places no
importance on the corporate form. Id.
63. Id. (citing Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy Inc., 805
F.2d 1074, 1081 (lst Cir. 1989)).
12
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The court decided that this goal would be frustrated if the mere
act of incorporation were allowed to impede recovery of response
costs, since a violator could avoid liability simply by changing
company structure from a proprietorship or partnership to a
corporation.6
B. "Defenses" Under CERCLA
Under CERCLA, federal courts have generally imposed joint
and several strict liability on those parties involved in the opera-
tion of hazardous waste site facilities. 65 Section 113 of the Act,
however, provides that, "any person may seek contribution from
any other person who is liable under section 107(a). 66 Thus, a
person held liable under the Act may institute an action to re-
cover a percentage of the cleanup costs from other responsible
parties for the conditions at a particular waste site.
Defendants subject to section 107(a) may also seek to raise
three available affirmative defenses under the Act.67 Section
107(b) allows a defendant to escape liability by establishing "by a
preponderance of the evidence" that the actual or threatened re-
lease was caused solely by: (1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; (3)
the act or omission of a third party; or (4) any combination of the
above.68 Because of the strict liability standard applied by the
majority of the courts in interpreting CERCLA, these defenses
64. Id.
65. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 30 for full text of section 113(f) (1).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). CERCLA section 107(b) provides:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a per-
son who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the re-
lease or threat of release of a hazardous substance and the damages
resulting therefrom were caused solely by:
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act or war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or
agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in
connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indi-
rectly, with a defendant (except where the sole contractual arrangement
arises from a published tariff and acceptance for carriage by a common
carrier by rail), if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the
evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous
substance concerns, taking into consideration the characteristics of
such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and circum-
stances, and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omis-
sion of any such third party and the consequences that could
foreseeably result from such acts or omissions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
Id.
68. See supra note 67.
1990] 549
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would appear to provide the broadest means of avoiding liability
under the Act. 69 Two recent cases interpreting section 107(b),
however, demonstrate the limited scope of these defenses.
In Smith Land & Imp. Corp. v. Celotex Corp. ,70 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that the doctrine of
"caveat emptor" was not a valid defense against liability under
CERCLA. 71 The court held that a corporate successor to a manu-
facturer of asbestos, who had sold land containing hazardous
waste, was liable in contribution to the buyer of that land for its
proportionate share of the cleanup costs. 72
The court reasoned that, if the doctrine of caveat emptor
were incorporated as a defense under the Act, a purchaser would
be barred from recovering any cleanup costs from other responsi-
ble parties and thereby "frustrate the Congress' desire to en-
courage cleanup by any responsible party."73 The court stated
that if the fair apportionment of the cleanup expenses were not
assured, it would be "unlikely that one party will take remedial
actions promptly when it could simply delay, awaiting a legal rul-
ing on the contribution of liability of other responsible parties. ' 74
The court affirmed the government's right to seek response
costs from any of the responsible parties. 75 Those chosen could
then, in turn, receive contribution from other potentially liable
parties. The court noted, however, that if the price of the tract of
land in question had been reduced to allow for future environ-
mental cleanup claims, the purchaser would not be entitled to
double compensation by then seeking contribution from other
potentially responsible parties.76
The most effective defense raised under CERCLA is the
third-party defense found in section 107(b)(3) of CERCLA, which
requires that a third party be solely liable for a hazardous waste
69. Comment, Developments in Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1485,
1520 (1986).
70. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3d
Cir. 1988).
71. Id. at 88. The court interpreted CERCLA section 113(o to allow an
individual to seek contribution from anyone who is liable under section 107(a)
of the Act. Id. Thus, a current owner of a facility, as well as the entity that
owned the facility at the time the hazardous substances were deposited, were
both liable under CERCLA for the expense of rectifying the condition. Id. at 89.
72. Id. at 89. The court found that the defense of caveat emptor was not
included in those defenses found in CERCLA section 107(b). Id.
73. Id. at 89-90.
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release. The third party must be someone other than an em-
ployee or agent of the defendant, "or other than one whose act or
omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship ex-
isting directly or indirectly with the defendant."177
A third party must be solely responsible for the hazardous
waste release at a particular site for section 107(b)(3) to constitute
a valid defense for a CERCLA defendant. In State of Washington v.
Time Oil Co. ,78 the district court addressed the issue of whether a
defendant corporation was entitled to the "innocent landowner
defense" pursuant to section 101(35)(A) of CERCLA. This sec-
tion provides, in part, that a defendant will not be held liable
under the Act if, at the time of acquiring a facility he did not know
and had no reason to suspect that "any hazardous substance
which is the subject of the release or threatened release was dis-
posed of on, in, or at the facility .... "79 The court determined
that, in order to successfully assert such a defense under section
101(35)(A), a defendant must first satisfy the statutory require-
ments found in section 107(b)(3) requiring: (1) the sole liability
of a third party for the hazardous waste release; and (2) proof of
due care by the defendant in his efforts to prevent releases of haz-
ardous waste at a site.8 0
The court found that, although the defendant corporation
had established that a third party sublessee contributed to the re-
lease of hazardous waste on the defendant's property, the defend-
ant failed to meet the two essential elements for a valid defense
under section 107(b)(3). 8 1 First, the defendant failed to offer
77. See supra note 67 for full text of CERCLA section 107(b).
78. State of Washington v. Time Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. 529 (W.D. Wash.
1988).
79. Id. at 530. See also CERCLA section 101(35)(A) which provides in part:
The term "contractual relationship" for the purpose of section
9607(b)(3) of this tide includes, but is not limited to, land contracts,
deeds or other instruments transferring title or possession, unless the
real property on which the facility concerned is located was acquired by
the defendant after disposal or replacement of the hazardous sub-
stances on, in, or at the facility, and one or more of the circumstances
described in clauses (i), (ii), or (iii) is also established by the defendant
by a preponderance of the evidence:
(i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did
not know and had no reason to know that any hazardous substance
which is the subject of the release or threatened release was disposed of
on, in, or at the facility. .
42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A).
80. Time, 687 F. Supp. at 530; (1982). See supra note 67 for full text of CER-
CLA section 107(b).
81. Id. at 532-33.
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proof that the release was caused solely by a third party for whom
the defendant was not responsible.8 2 Secondly, the defendant
was unable to establish that it had exercised due care in taking
those necessary precautions with respect to the hazardous sub-
stances found on the site.8 3 Because the defendant was aware
that its sublessee was running a sloppy operation on its property
and failed to take precautions to prevent potential releases of haz-
ardous substances as a result of these operations, the court found
that the defendant was unable to establish that its sublessee was
solely responsible for the release.84
Smith Land & Imp. Corp. 85 and Time Oil Co. 8 6 demonstrate how
the courts have interpreted the CERCLA defenses in a way that
minimizes the social costs of hazardous waste releases.8 7 The
burden of cleaning up a hazardous waste site remains jointly on
the landowners and land users.88 The rationale for imposing
such liability on otherwise innocent landowners is that it creates
incentives for these landowners to do business with responsible
contractors and to monitor their activities89 This rule is particu-
larly pertinent when a corporation has knowledge of or control
over the safety measures implemented by its corporate contrac-
tors in the hazardous waste business.90
82. Id. at 532. The court stated that, because the defendant corporation
could not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that neither itself nor its
sublessee were not responsible for the hazardous substance release on the land,
they were unable to assert a section 107(b) defense under CERCILA. Id. at 532-
33.
83. Id. at 533. The court held that the defendant corporation permitted its
sublessee to run a sloppy oil operation which led to the accumulation of hazard-
ous oil byproducts and the subsequent release of the hazardous substance into
the local environment. Id. The court therefore found that the defendant corpo-
ration failed to exercise due care to prevent the property from becoming con-
taminated by its sublessee. Id.
84. Id.
85. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3d
Cir. 1988).
86. State of Washington v. Time Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. 529 (W.D. Wash.
1988).
87. See Smith, 851 F.2d at 92; Time, 687 F. Supp. at 530-1.
88. See supra notes 67-83 and accompanying text.
89. See Comment, The Liability of Financial Institutions for Hazardous Waste
Cleanup Costs Under CERCLA, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 139, 159 (1988) (stating that
CERCLA's broad liability provisions and limited affirmative defenses ensure that
all potentially responsible parties will be made to pay for cleanup of these haz-
ardous waste sites); see also Note, Encouraging Safety Through Insurance Based Incen-
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IV. RECOVERING THE CLEANUP COSTS UNDER
CERCLA
A. The Problem of Determining Proportionate Liability Under
CERCLA
While current caselaw interpreting section 107 of CERCLA
has been generally successful in defining who may be responsible
for the cleanup of a hazardous waste site, the Act fails to provide a
process for discerning the proportionate share of liability among
multiple parties. 91 The courts have been equally unable to sup-
plement the Act with a uniform system of apportioning liability
for the cleanup of hazardous wastes. 92
A typical waste storage site may contain innumerable broken
and rusting barrels of toxic waste, intermingling with each other
as their chemical contents seep into the local environment.93 In-
dividual defendants may attempt to present evidence showing
that the hazardous waste products for which they are responsible
were segregated from the rest of the toxic substances on the site.
But in such cases, apportionment may be virtually impossible. If
two co-mingled hazardous substances are released from a site at
the same time, the defendants will have little chance of providing
precise information for the apportionment of the cleanup costs. 94
The courts' tacit approval of joint and several liability under
CERCLA has provided the means by which the EPA may bring
suits against the wealthiest responsible defendants to recover the
full cleanup costs, without expending large amounts of money on
multiple lawsuits against other potentially insolvent responsible
parties.95 In this respect, joint and several liability is unfair be-
91. CERCLA section 113(f) provides a person with the right to contribution
under the Act to establish a system for determining proportionate liability.
92. One party may be found to be jointly and severally liable for the
cleanup of hazardous waste and sue other parties directly to recover a portion of
those cleanup costs. See generally, Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct.
2273 (1989); Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d
1568 (5th Cir. 1988); New York v. Shore Realty Co., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir.
1985); Rockwell International Corp. v. UI International Corp. 702 F. Supp. 1384
(N.D. Ill. 1988); Channel Master Satellite Systems, Inc. v. JFD Electronics Corp.,
702 F. Supp. 1229 (E.D.N.C. 1988); Bulk Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co.,
589 F. Supp. 1437 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
93. Comment, Developments in Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1485,
1528 (1986). Under this scenario, the harm could be indivisible if apportion-
ment of the cleanup costs are impossible to determine. Id.
94. Id.
95. Joint and several strict liability under CERCLA allows the EPA to target
responsible parties, for the cleanup of a hazardous waste site, who have the
ready funds to compensate the EPA expenditures made by the EPA in its initial
1990] 553
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cause it may force one party to contribute an exorbitant amount
of funds for the cleanup of a hazardous waste site to which it con-
tributed a fragment of the hazardous waste and derived little, if
any, financial benefit.96
While the threat of joint and several liability provides an in-
centive for established corporations to create more efficient sys-
tems of treating and storing hazardous wastes, small companies
lacking sufficient funds to cover a potential release of hazardous
wastes may be protected from liability under the Act.97 Smaller
companies realize that if they are brought into a suit by the EPA,
these high-visibility corporations will also be available to share
the cleanup costs. Unencumbered by the fear of potential liability
under CERCLA, these smaller companies are able to manufacture
products at a level and price which undermine the economic
foundation of those highly visible companies that are obligated to
comply with CERCLA's safety provisions.98
Highly visible defendants who have been required to com-
pensate in full all expenditures made by the EPA in its reclama-
tion of a waste site may implead other responsible parties in order
to recover their proportionate share of the cleanup costs. 99 By
the time they are able to institute action against these smaller de-
fendants, however, many may have already become judgment
proof or filed for bankruptcy. Even if it can be determined that all
impleaded parties are solvent, they are still only liable to the de-
fendant corporations for their proportionate share of the cleanup
costs. Joint and several liability does not apply to contribution
actions and thus liability for the shares of absent parties must be
borne by the original defendants alone.' 00 These original de-
cleanup of a site, without inculpating the remaining responsible parties who may
not have the funds necessary to clean up the site. Therefore, the responsible
party with the most funds is burdened with the majority of the cleanup costs,
and, like the EPA, will not expend large amounts of money in law suits to re-
cover cleanup costs from other liable persons who may be insolvent and unable
to contribute their proportionate share of the costs.
96. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
97. Id.
98. Comment, Developments in Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1485,
1531 (1986). One of the ways to correct this inequitable result would be if the
EPA was obligated to implead all responsible parties connected with the site in
suits for contribution, obligating each responsible party to pay its share of the
cleanup bill. Id.
99. See generally Note, "The Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous
Waste Cleanup Damages," 99 HARV. L. REV. 986 (1986).
100. See Comment, The Liability of Financial Institutions for Hazardous Waste
Cleanup Costs Under CERCLA, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 139, 151 (1988).
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fendants may also be unable to recover excessive litigation costs
from these smaller responsible parties. This legal reality is an-
other factor protecting the subset of smaller responsible parties
from liability under the Act, since a CERCLA defendant may not
deem it worthwhile to sue another responsible party where that
party's proportionate share of the cleanup cost is less than the
cost of litigation.' 0 '
B. A Recommended Revision of CERCLA's Inadequate
Financial Responsibility Provisions
It has been suggested that financial responsibility provisions
would provide an incentive for corporations, large and small, to
either establish more stringent safety measures for the disposal
and storage of hazardous waste or maintain minimum levels of
insurance to cover potential liability under CERCLA. 10 2
To date, CERCLA's financial responsibility provisions re-
quire coverage against liability for cleanup costs under an ex-
tremely expansive liability standard.' 03 The joint and several
strict liability standard found in the Act requires insurers under
section 108(c) to assume initial liability for all response costs
and resource damages.l°4 In order to recover those losses attrib-
101. Id.
102. Note, Encouraging Safety Through Insurance Based Incentives: Financial Re-
sponsibility for Hazardous Wastes, 96 YALE L. J. 403, 405 (1986).
103. See supra note 9 for full text of section 107(a).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 9608(c). CERCLA section 108(c) provides:
(1) Releases from vessels
In the case of a release or threatened release from a vessel any
claim authorized by section 9607 or 9611 of this title may be asserted
directly against any guarantor providing evidence of financial responsi-
bility for such facility under subsection (a) of this section. In defending
such a claim, the guarantor may invoke all rights and defenses which
would be available to the owner or operator under this subchapter.
The guarantor may also invoke the defense of the owner or operator
but the guarantor may not invoke any other defense that the guarantor
might have been entitled to invoke in a proceeding brought by the
owner or operator against him.
(2) Releases from facilities
In the case of a release or threatened release from a facility, any
claim authorized by section 9607 or 9611 of this title may be asserted
directly against any guarantor providing evidence of financial responsi-
bility for such facility under subsection (b) of this section if the person
liable under section 9607 of this title is in bankruptcy, reorganization,
or arrangement pursuant to the Federal Bankruptcy Code, or if, with
reasonable diligence, jurisdiction in the Federal courts cannot be ob-
tained over a person liable under section 9607 of this title who is likely
to be solvent at the time ofjudgement. In the case of any action pursu-
ant to this paragraph, the guarantor shall be entitled to invoke all rights
and defenses which would have been available to the person liable
19
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utable to violations of policy restrictions, insurers must bring
separate actions against their insureds.l0 5 This inequitable distri-
bution of liability under CERCLA undermines the ability of insur-
ance companies to provide affordable insurance policies to
corporations conducting business in the field of hazardous waste
disposal and storage.
It is suggested that the liability provisions established in
CERCLA do not induce corporations to invest in accident avoid-
ance measures or to purchase liability insurance. This is because
CERCLA has failed to specifically address the liability of parent
corporations for the acts of their subsidiaries in the treatment and
disposal of hazardous wastes. Parent corporations, who are the
majority stockholders of their subsidiary companies, may be
shielded by their shareholder status from absolute liability under
CERCLA.10 6 Under section 107(a), a parent corporation is only
under section 9607 of this title if any action had been brought against
such a person by the claimant and all rights and defenses which would
have been available to the guarantor if the action had been brought
against the guarantor by such person.
Id.
105. Because section 108(c) of CERCLA provides tort claimants under the
Act with the right to recover all response costs and resource damages directly
from insurers, with the exception of any willful contract violations by their in-
sureds, insurance companies must bring separate actions against these insureds
to recover deductibles and other losses resulting from policy violations. See
supra note 104 for the full text of section 108(c) of CERCLA; see also Note, En-
courging Safety Through Insurance Based Incentives: Financial Responsibility for Hazard-
ous Wastes, 96 YAuE L.J. 403, 420 (1986).
106. See Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T. L. James & Co., Inc., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir.
1990). The court held that the definition of "owner" and "operator" of a haz-
ardous waste facility found in section 107(a)(2) of CERCLA did not include the
parent corporation of an offending wholly-owned subsidiary. Id. at 82. The
court stated that the legislative history of CERCLA failed to indicate that Con-
gress meant to alter the traditional corporate law principle of limited liability.
Id. The court further determined that if Congress had intended for section
107(a)(2) to alter the interpretation of the judicially created principle of limited
liability, its intent would have been specific within the provision. Id. at 83. See
also State v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 500, 468 A.2d 150, (1983). In Ventron,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that, in the absence of federal or state
statutory provisions to the contrary, common law principles permit courts to
pierce the corporate veil to find a parent corporation liable for the acts of its
subsidiary in very limited circumstances. Id. at 164. Only when it has been de-
termined that:
(1) the parent corporation dominated the subsidiary to such an extent that it
was a mere instrumentality of the parent corporation; and (2) that the parent
corporation abused the privilege of incorporation to perpetuate fraud or injus-
tice or otherwise circumvent the law. Id. The fact that a subsidiary was under-
capitalized and influenced by the personnel, directors, and officers of the parent
corporation in the course of running the day-to-day business was not found by
the court to be a dispositive factor in the determination that the parent corpora-
tion so dominated its subsidiary that it should be liable for the acts of the subsid-
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liable to the extent of its investment in the subsidiary corpora-
tion.10 7 Thus, if the subsidiary lacks the sufficient funds to ade-
quately clean up a waste site, most of the costs for the cleanup
may fall upon involuntary creditors: the government and resi-
dents of the community.' 08
Because of the prevalence of subsidiary corporations in the
waste disposal field, hazardous waste sites have increased in
number at an uncontrollable rate. With well over 10,000 hazard-
ous waste sites within the United States, the EPA has at times
found it difficult to adequately monitor and enforce the safety
regulations adopted under CERCLA.I°9 It is therefore implausi-
ble that the government or local residents have the ability to pro-
tect against the potential release of a hazardous substance into
the local environment more effectively than the subsidiary's par-
ent corporation. Parent corporations are organized with the pur-
pose of monitoring activities throughout the organization
inexpensively and may cheaply and effectively oversee the activi-
ties of their subsidiaries."10
Additionally, a parent corporation is in a better position to
bear the risk of a hazardous release than the subsidiary or local
community. The parent corporation, when pricing its products,
can spread part of the risk of hazardous releases among its cus-
tomers."1 ' Since the parent corporation is in the position of be-
ing better informed as to the risk taken by its subsidiary in the
storage of hazardous waste, it can insure against a potential re-
lease."l 2 Insurance and financial markets enable parent corpora-
tions and their shareholders to spread the risk of hazardous waste
activities."l 3 Such risk-spreading considerations support impos-
ing liability for the release of hazardous wastes by insolvent sub-
sidiary corporations on their corporate parents.1 4  An
iary. Id. at 165. See also Caraig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, LTD., 843 F.2d 145,
151-52 (3d Cir. 1988); Allied Corp. v. Frola, 701 F. Supp. 1084, 1090-91 (D.N.J.
1988).
107. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. See also Note, Liability of
Parent Corporations for Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Damages, 99 HARV. L. REV. 986,
990 (1986).
108. Id.
109. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
110. See generally H. MINTZBERG, THE STRUCTURING OF ORGANIZATIONS, 17-
50 (1979) (describing hierarchical structure of modem corporation).
1 11. See Note, Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Waste Cleanup and
Damages, 99 HARV. L. REV. 986, 995-96.
112. See Id.
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amendment to the Act providing joint and several liability for par-
ent corporations would encourage corporations to set up hazard-
ous waste disposal sites which are adequately capitalized and
sufficiently monitored, thereby reducing the risk of future re-
leases of hazardous waste.
V. PROVIDING MANDATORY INSURANCE COVERAGE
UNDER CERCLA
Requiring corporations to obtain insurance policies to cover
potential response and cleanup costs is the most effective means
to: (1) monitor the safety measures taken by corporations in-
volved in the storage and disposal of hazardous waste; and (2)
recover capital taken out of Superfund to cover the cleanup costs
of insolvent corporations. 15 Insurers are adept in analyzing risks
associated with particular business ventures and share the risk of
undesirable outcomes with their policy holders. 1 6 If Congress
were to enact legislation mandating insurance coverage for the
four categories of "owners and operators" under section 107(a)
of CERCLA, the result, as at least one commentator suggests,
would be that "insurance-based incentives would significantly im-
prove the government's ability to control environmental risks
115. At present, CERCLA does not require owners and operators of haz-
ardous waste site facilities or vessels carrying hazardous waste to procure liabil-
ity insurance. But sections 108(a) and 108(b) of CERCLA do require from the
owner or operator of each vessel and facility evidence of financial responsibility
"to cover the liability prescribed under paragraph (1) of section 9607 of this
tide." 42 U.S.C. 9608(b)(2). Evidence of such financial responsibility may be
satisfied through "insurance guarantee, surety bond, letter of credit, or qualifi-
cation as a self insurer." 42 U.S.C. § 9608(b)(2). Subchapter IV of CERCLA
relating to pollution insurance requires owners and operators under the Act to
insure themselves through "risk retention" groups if they are unable to procure
pollution insurance from an insurance group. 42 U.C.S. § 9673. A risk reten-
tion group is defined in section 171(3) of CERCLA as:
any corporation or other limited liability association taxable as a corpo-
ration, or as an insurance company under the laws of any State -
(A) whose primary activity consists of assuming and spreading all or
any portion of the pollution liability of its group members;
(B) which is organized for the primary purpose of conducting the activ-
ity described under subparagraph (A);
(C) which is chartered or licensed as an insurance company and author-
ized to engage in the business of insurance under the laws of any state;
and
(D) which does not exclude any person from membership in the group
solely to provide for members of such a group a competitive advantage
over such a person.
Id.
116. See Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 942, 945-55 (1988).
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coming from hazardous waste sites."' " 7
At present, CERCLA's joint and several strict liability stan-
dard established under section 107118 is incompatible with the
formula used by insurers to calculate liability, which is based
upon a corporation's net assets rather than the aggregate costs of
the cleanup of a hazardous waste release. 19 Additionally, section
108 of CERCLA states that any claim authorized by sections 107
and 111 of the Act may be asserted against any insurer.1 20
Promoting insurance-based incentives under CERCLA would
require two amendments. First, it has been suggested that the
standard of joint and several strict liability under CERCLA sec-
tion 107 should be substituted by one based on individual contri-
bution to a particular hazardous waste site.12' By allowing for the
possibility of a sole responsible party to bear all the expenses of
cleanup of a particular hazardous waste site, CERCLA places an
intolerable burden on both solvent enterprises and their insur-
ers.' 22 While Superfund may be utilized to cover expenses
incurred to remove hazardous waste, solvent generators, trans-
porters, and owners and operators of hazardous waste sites still
117. Note, Encouraging Safety Through Insurance Based Incentives: Financial Re-
sponsibility for Hazardous Wastes, 96 YALE L. J. 403, 412 (1986).
118. See supra note 9 for full text of section 107(a).
119. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 942, 978 (1988). With the passage of CERCLA in 1980, courts around the
country have incorporated joint and several liability into their overall analysis of
CERCLA cases. Id. at 959. Joint and several liability creates uncertainty among
insurers because the probability of liability and loss to the insurer is affected by
the actions of nonpolicyholders "whom the insurer cannot identify in advance
... A single generator of waste may be liable for all the costs of the cleanup of a
particular site despite the generator's lack of fault, the presence of waste con-
tributed by other generators, and the partial responsibility of the owner or oper-
ator of the site for the release of material into the surrounding environment. Id.
See also Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 88 (3d
Cir. 1988); New York v. Shore Realty Co., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052-53 (2d Cir.
1985); State of Washington v. Time Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. 529, 532 (W.D. Wash.
1988).
120. See supra note 104 for full text of section 108(c).
121. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 492, 978 (1988). It is not suggested in Professor Abraham's article that
utilization ofjoint and several liability under CERCLA should be abandoned in
all circumstances; rather, it should become the standard for contribution to
Superfund by those parties generally liable for the hazardous waste problem in
the country. Id. Superfund would only be utilized when those parties responsi-
ble for specific waste sites cannot be located or are insolvent. Id. With these
modifications in the liability provisions of CERCLA, the group most responsible
for the dumping of hazardous waste into inadequate waste site facilities, and not
the average taxpayer, would be responsible for the cleanup costs. Id.
122. Id. 978-80 (1988).
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bear the majority of the cleanup costs under CERCLA.12 3 Sec-
ond, Congress should delete those CERCLA provisions under
section 108(c) which require insurers to assume initial liability for
all response costs and resource damages incurred by their in-
sureds. These revisions would reduce the costs to insurers of en-
forcing their policy conditions by incorporating into their
contracts provisions which would make their insureds directly lia-
ble for certain deductible amounts. 124
Changes within the insurance industry itself are also required
to provide greater access to environmental liability insurance.
Two theories for implementing these necessary changes have
been introduced in an article by Professor Kenneth S. Abraham in
a recent edition of the Columbia Law Review. First, through the
incorporation of a system of retroactive indexing, a policy would
cover both anticipated and unanticipated forms of environmental
liability. 125 Premiums would be paid out to the insurer in a two-
123. See CERCLA § 107(c).
124. See Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88
CoLum. L. REV. 942 (1988). By making an insured directly liable for certain
deductible amounts, the insured is given "a stake in the avoidance of losses
notwithstanding the existence of coverage because the insured is responsible for
the deductible amount even if a loss is otherwise covered... A party purchasing
coverage subject to the deductible aligns its interests with those of the insurer
because both will suffer if the insured incurs a loss." Id. at 951-52. Thus, the
deductible can be used not only as a method of compensation for insurers,
which can be increased or decreased depending upon the risk associated with an
insured's business, it can also be used to encourage safer methods of storing
hazardous wastes around the country. Id.
125. Id. at 982. Professor Abraham addresses several potential difficulties
with his proposal for retroactive indexing. First, those enterprises purchasing
insurance each year could be subject to extensive liabilities to their insurers on
an annual basis as a result of the delayed payment of the second premium and
the potential for escalation in environmental liabilities during the course of the
year. Id. Professor Abraham confronts this potential flaw by arguing that retro-
active indexing provides access to insurance coverage which at present is either
over-priced or unavailable. Id. at 983. Additionally, if environmental liabilities
diminished during the course of the year, the two-step approach could result in
lower premiums for insureds. Id.
A second drawback to retroactive indexing is potential bankruptcy of the
insured during the interim between payment of the first and second premiums.
Id. Payment on the second premium could also be accelerated or the insured
could be given priority in a bankruptcy proceeding in order to assure payment.
Id.
The final difficulty in Professor Abraham's proposal for a system of retroac-
tive indexing centers around the problem of defining those developments in the
area of environmental liability which would entitle an insurer to collect on the
second premium. Id. Professor Abraham suggests that this matter could be
taken care of by measuring "state or national increases in claim frequency and
severity in the category or categories of claims insured." Id. at 984.
24
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step process extending over a period of years.'2 6 The initial pay-
ment would be based upon an index of the liabilities in the areas
of tort and insurance law at the time the policy was entered into
between the insurer and the insured. 127 Any monetary increase in
the second premium would be conditioned on subsequent devel-
opments in the law which would either contract or expand the
environmental liability of the insured.' 2l To protect against po-
tential bankruptcy of the insured during the interim between the
two payments, several precautionary measures could be taken,
such as: (1) payment of the second premium based on an annual
assessment by the insurer; and (2) granting priority of the insurer
over other creditors in any bankruptcy proceeding involving an
insured. Any increased payments on the second premium would
be dependent upon new developments in the law and upon the
frequency of claims brought against insurers based upon these
environmental liability insurance policies. 129
A second theory to be considered is based upon the deregu-
lation of the insurance market. This would entail the disassem-
bling of an array of state and federal regulations in the area of
environmental insurance, such as: (1) the maintenance of a mini-
mum reserve of money to assure payment of the claims; and (2)
the relaxation of state commissioners monitoring of insurance
companies' financial ability to ensure solvency.'i s The terms of
the insurance policy, although similar to traditional insurance
policies, would no longer come with a guaranty of solvency on the
part of the insurer when and if the insured desired to collect on
the policy.' 3 1 The risks involved in such insurance would have to
be disclosed to potential insureds in the absence of regulations
requiring insurer contribution to guaranty funds or minimal capi-
126. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
127. Id.
128. See Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 942, 985-88 (1988).
129. Id. at 986. Professor Abraham states that present regulations preempt
involvement by nontraditional entrepreneurs in the insurance industry due to
their inability to secure the funds required by present insurance industry regula-
tions in order to guaranty their solvency. Id. This Article suggests that the rea-
son behind the disappearance of environmental liability insurance in the past
few years is due to the fact that regulatory controls in the insurance industry
have precluded the insured from bearing the risk of the insurer's insolvency, a
step which would reduce the risks of the insurer in marketing highly uncertain
environmental liability insurance. Id. at 988.
130. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
131. See Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 942, 987 (1988).
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tal reserves.13 2 Despite the possibility of insolvency on the part of
the insurer, such a scheme would be an improvement to a market
which presently offers inadequate and exorbitantly priced envi-
ronmental liability insurance.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment has attempted to present a general overview
of the current trend taken by the courts toward the expansion of
CERCIA liability under section 107. While the courts have been
successful in assuring that all parties who have contributed to the
hazardous waste site are responsible for its cleanup, the Act's
standard ofjoint and several strict liability has hindered equitable
distribution of those costs among the responsible parties. Highly
visible corporations remain the target of governmental suits for
the reimbursement of capital taken out of Superfund. Small cor-
porations remain shielded from contribution suits brought by
these initial defendant corporations due to insufficient funds or
bankruptcy. As a result, large corporations have promoted the
creation of inadequately funded subsidiary companies to offset
the high costs of meeting the safety standards established under
CERCLA. These corporations are able to maintain, through their
subsidiaries, waste facilities whose ineffective design and safety
precautions continue to threaten local environments nationwide.
CERCLA should be amended to extend full liability to such par-
ent corporations. Mandatory insurance under CERCLA provides
the most effective means of compelling all responsible parties to
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